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Abstract 
We provide a systematic analysis of bilateral, source and host factors driving portfolio equity 
investment across countries, using newly-released data on international equity holdings at 
the end of 2001. We develop a model that links bilateral equity holdings to bilateral trade in 
goods and services and find that the data strongly support such a correlation. Larger 
bilateral positions are also associated with proxies for informational proximity. We further 
document that the scale of aggregate foreign equity asset and liability holdings is larger  for 
richer countries and countries with more developed stock markets.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
This paper is motivated by the idea that understanding the geography of international 
investment provides insights into the globalization process. In a fully-integrated global 
economy without frictions in product or asset markets, benchmark economic theory suggests 
that investors should hold identical portfolios, regardless of nationality. Documenting and 
explaining deviations from this benchmark position potentially reveals the nature of the 
current limitations on global economic integration. For instance, how do frictions in product 
markets affect the structure of international financial trade? Are cultural/informational factors 
important in explaining the bilateral structure of international portfolios? What is the 
connection between domestic and international financial development? Answers to these 
questions are of interest for several fields in economics, including international 
macroeconomics and international finance, portfolio analysis, and behavioral finance. 
 
An especially intriguing feature in international equity investment patterns is the presence of 
strong bilateral variation in portfolio allocations, in that different source countries attach 
sharply different weights across various host (destination) countries. Identifying the bilateral 
factors that explain these portfolio asymmetries is a major focus of our work.  
 
Moreover, the determinants of bilateral holdings also combine to affect aggregate positions:  
a financially-remote country will receive less inward investment and faces a higher cost of 
equity capital.  Asymmetries in the geography of international investment also have 
potentially important implications for other international economic linkages. Most obviously, 
a negative shock in host country C will have a more negative wealth effect on investor 
country A than investor country B, if country A’s portfolio is more heavily weighted towards 
country C. In related fashion, the geography of investment positions also heavily shapes 
international risk-sharing patterns. 
 
Interest in studying these linkages has been heightened by the increase in international 
portfolio diversification over the past few years, as well as by evidence of increased co-
movements between the main economic and financial variables of the world’s largest 
economies, over and above what could be explained by trade. The pattern of bilateral 
financial linkages may influence the matrix of correlations in asset prices (Forbes and Chinn 
2003) and may also affect the degree of business cycle synchronization (Imbs 2004a, 2004b). 
Relatedly, it may also affect the covariance structure of real exchange rates: if countries A 
and B have extensive bilateral financial cross-holdings whereas country C is financially 
isolated, then we may expect larger real exchange rate movements between countries A and 
C than between countries A and B. 
 
Although some authors have previously considered aspects of the geography of international 
investment patterns, data limitations have meant that these contributions have been quite 
narrowly focused: for example, only considering a single source country (most often, the 
US).  In this paper, we make use of a new data set on international portfolio positions in 
order to explore this topic in a comprehensive manner. The data provide a geographical   - 2 - 
 
breakdown of international portfolio holdings at end-2001 by 67 source countries, which 
include virtually all major international investors.
1  
 
In contrast to much of the existing literature, we attempt to guide our empirical work with 
reference to a simple theoretical model of bilateral equity investment patterns. In particular, 
we extend the work of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), presenting a simple theoretical 
framework that highlights trade as an important potential determinant of bilateral portfolio 
equity holdings. In our empirical analysis, we also explore the roles played by financial and 
informational frictions. In addition to highlighting the role of bilateral factors in explaining 
the structure of countries’ equity asset portfolios, our empirical work also considers the role 
of aggregate country characteristics in explaining the overall size of countries’ foreign equity 
asset and liability positions.  
 
There is a rapidly increasing literature trying to explain international patterns of bilateral 
investment. Typically, this literature has used empirical methods borrowed from the 
traditional gravity models of international goods trade, and has focused on direct investment 
and bank lending, for which data is readily available (from the OECD and BIS, respectively). 
Studies focusing on the geography of foreign direct investment include Wei (2000) and Stein 
and Daude (2003), among many others. Studies on bank lending include Buch (2002, 2003); 
Buch et al (2003); and Kawai and Liu (2001). Ghosh and Wolf (2001) and Sarisoy (2003) 
conduct a comparative analysis of the impact of spatial factors on different international 
investment categories, as do, for the United States, Portes, Rey and Oh (2001).   
 
A number of papers have also focused more specifically on the pattern of bilateral equity 
investment. For example, Portes and Rey (2003) use portfolio equity flows from Capital Data 
and show that proxies for informational asymmetries, together with the size of host countries’ 
stock markets, are key determinants of the pattern of international equity flows. Other studies 
on the geography of the stock of portfolio equity investment have focused primarily on a 
single source country: the United States (Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2003), Mann and 
Meade (2002); Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2002)) and Ireland (Honohan 
and Lane (2000)).
2 An exception is a recent paper by Yildirim (2003) that also exploits the 
2001 CPIS data, employing a methodology different from ours. She examines the role of 
various corporate governance indicators in determining investment patterns, employing a 
subset of the CPIS data (23 source countries, 49 host countries) for which such data are 
available.  
 
                                                 
1 A still preliminary and incomplete set of data for end-2002 was posted on the IMF website 
in February 2004. The correlation in bilateral positions for end-2001 and end-2002 is 0.99 for 
those country pairs for which data are available for both years. 
2 Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Huberman (2001) explore regional investment patterns 
within the US.   - 3 - 
 
Several of these studies are related to the voluminous literature on home bias. This literature 
is relevant: however, our approach is substantially different in focus, in that we also place 
heavy emphasis on explaining the structure of the international component of portfolios 
rather than the split between domestic and foreign allocations.
3  
 
Relative to the existing literature, this project innovates on both the theoretical and the 
empirical front. With regard to theory, we develop a coherent framework for analyzing 
bilateral equity holdings. With regard to empirics, the availability of detailed cross-country 
data permits a more comprehensive study of the determinants of international investment 
patterns that allows the joint analysis of both bilateral and aggregate positions.  
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section II develops a theoretical 
framework, and Section III the empirical strategy. Section IV describes the data and 
discusses some relevant interpretation issues. Econometric results are reported in Section V.  
Some preliminary conclusions and directions for future research are outlined in Section VI. 
 
 
II.   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In respect of theory, we can identify three main approaches to modeling bilateral equity 
investment positions, illustrated by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), Martin and Rey (2003) and 
Davis, Nalewaik, and Willen (2001) respectively.  
 
In a two-country setting, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) show that the existence of frictions in 
product markets naturally generates a home bias in equity positions, even if global financial 
markets are complete. We develop an N-country generalization of this model later in this 
section, in order to draw out the implications of this approach for the bilateral composition of 
foreign portfolio holdings. 
 
In contrast, Martin and Rey (2003) focus on transactional frictions in asset markets.
4 Their 
framework postulates incomplete asset markets, iceberg costs in financial markets, and 
endogenous asset creation: larger countries will have deeper domestic equity markets and a 
reduction in financial trade costs leads to more international asset trade. This approach 
generates a bilateral equation for equity positions as a function of the cost of bilateral 
financial trade and the endogenously-determined market capitalization levels. These authors 
broadly interpret financial frictions to include informational asymmetries. 
                                                 
3 Pinkowitz et al. (2002) treat the domestic allocation of US investors as being symmetric to 
the foreign allocation: however, some sources of home bias plausibly imply that the 
determinants of domestic investment are not identical to those for overseas investment. 
4 See also the application in Martin and Rey (2000). The working paper version of Ahearne 
at al (2004) generate a similar reduced form, employing the portfolio model with country-
specific proportional investment costs that was originally developed by Cooper and Kaplanis 
(1986)   - 4 - 
 
 
Davis, Nalewaik and Willen (2001) also focus on financial market incompleteness. In their 
setup, a domestic agent faces a risky labor income stream. Domestic financial instruments 
consist of a riskless and a risky asset. The ability of a domestic agent to diversify risk at 
home depends on the correlation between labor income and the return on the risky asset. The 
degree to which the availability of a second risky asset (an international equity fund) 
improves risk allocation depends on its correlation with domestic labor income, in addition to 
its correlation with the domestic risky asset. The authors develop a procedure to assess the 
gains to international financial trade in risky assets that depends on these correlations. 
Importantly, agents from different countries will hold different combinations of risky assets, 
since the differences in labor income streams means that the “mutual fund separation 
theorem” does not hold: the returns on the various risky assets will have different correlations 
with the domestic labor income streams across countries.  
 
In what follows, we rely on an N-country generalization of the Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) 
model to generate a benchmark empirical equation, but also allow for the financial frictions 
highlighted by others in our empirical investigation. In a two-country setting, Obstfeld and 
Rogoff show that the existence of trading costs in the goods market naturally generates a 
home bias in equity positions, even if global financial markets are complete. These authors 
also note that an additional potential source of variation in bilateral investment patterns is 
heterogeneity in consumption preferences.
5  
 
In the N-country generalization of the Obstfeld-Rogoff model, the share of countryi’s equity 
that is held by country j  is: (a) a decreasing function of the bilateral trading cost between i 
and  j , relative to the average trading costs between country i and all other countries; and 
(b) an increasing function of the relative importance of good  i in country  j ’s consumption 
preferences. The relative statement is important: it is the same point made by Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003) in respect of “multilateral resistance” in product trade.  
 
The setup is as follows. There are N countries, each with a random endowment of a distinct 
perishable good: there is a symmetric joint distribution across 1 () N YY ... . A complete set of 
Arrow-Debreu securities are available. We consider a one-period portfolio problem.  
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5 It would be equivalent to model trade in intermediate inputs, which are then locally 
assembled into a nontradable final consumption good.   - 5 - 
 
where  ij ω  is the relative preference by consumers in country  j  for good i,  j C is the index of 
total real consumption, θ  is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods and ρ  is 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion. There are iceberg shipping costs: only a fraction 
(1 ) ij τ − of a unit of a good shipped from country i to country  j  survives the journey. We 
normalize  1, 0 jj jj j ω τ == ∀ .  
 
We assume competitive product markets such that  
 
 (1 ) ii ij ij PP τ = −  (2) 
 
where  ii ij PP ,  denotes the prices of good i in countries i and  j  respectively.  
 
Free trade in Arrow-Debreu securities implies that the ratio of marginal utilities of 
consumption for good i between agents in countries i and  j  must reflect the relative price 
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Under the simplifying assumption that  1 ρ θ = / , this further reduces to  
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It follows that the portfolio allocations required to generate equilibrium consumption shares 
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Under the simplifying assumption that  1 ρ θ = / , this allocation can be achieved under equity 
trade alone. The allocation means that country j holds a larger share in country i’s equity, the 
lower is the transport cost between countries i and j relative to the average transport cost 
between country i and all other countries; and the greater is the relevant importance attached 
to good i in country j’s consumption preferences.  
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The latter two terms are constant for fixed i across all pairs () ij ,  and so can be represented 
by a country-i constant. This allows us to simplify the expression to 
 
  log( ) ( 1)log(1 ) log( ) ij i ij ij x α θτ θ ω
∗ =+− − +  (9) 
 
The above analysis assumes symmetry across countries (i.e. identical shares in consumption 
in the absence of transport costs or heterogeneity in preferences). It is straightforward to 
allow for differences across countries (e.g. differences in relative country sizes). In fact, this 
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where the last term is the share of country j in global wealth. In the log transformation, this 
term can be represented by a country-j constant  
 
  log ( 1)log(1 ) log( ) ij i j ij ij ij x v αα θ τ θ ω
∗ 

 =++− −+ +  (11) 
 
Empirically, transport costs and consumer preferences are not directly observable. One 
approach would be to develop proxies for these variables. However, in the model, the volume 
of imports to country j from country i perfectly captures the impact of these variables. 
Indeed, the theoretical correspondence between equity holdings and imports is one-to-one 
 
 log( ) log( ) ij ij x IMP =  (12) 
 
 
Clearly, other bilateral factors—in addition to the level of imports—matter for the pattern of 
international equity investment. A simple way to account for these factors is the following.   - 7 - 
 
While equation (10) gives the benchmark allocation, frictions in financial markets, 
information asymmetries or behavioral-finance factors may induce deviations from this 
benchmark. These factors could be represented by  
 
 log( ) log ij ij i j ij ij xx F φ φγ η
∗ 

 − =++ + (13) 
 
where  , ij φ φ  denote “aggregate” financial frictions that apply at the level of the source and 
host countries and  ij F  denotes a set of factors that generate financial frictions at the bilateral 
level.  In combination with equation (10), this gives a new equation  
 
 log( ) log( ) ij i j ij ij ij xI M P F φ φσ γ ε = ++ + + (14) 
 
where we allow for a non-unitary coefficient on the trade variable in view of the possibility 
that bilateral trade may partly operate as an information variable that reduces bilateral 
financial frictions.
7 (Of course, measurement error in the imports variables is another reason 
to expect the coefficient estimate to deviate from unity.) 
 
III.   EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
We focus on a single cross-sectional observation for the structure of external equity 
portfolios for the year 2001.
8 In line with the theoretical framework developed in the 
previous section, our empirical strategy is to isolate the relative contributions of (i) bilateral 
factors; (ii) source-country factors; and (iii) host-country factors. Bilateral factors may 
explain the heterogeneity in the geographical composition of the asset portfolios of source 
countries and the investor bases of host countries. Controlling for these bilateral 
considerations, source-country factors help us to explain cross-country differences in the 
propensity to invest overseas while host-country factors are potentially important in 
determining variation in the attractiveness of different destinations for overseas investors.  
 
                                                 
7 This equation suggests that the appropriate specification for a regression explaining 
bilateral equity investment patterns should include both source- and host-country fixed 
effects. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003b) also emphasize the importance of including 
country dummies in gravity trade models, for analogous reasons. See also Baltagi et al 
(2003). Anderson and van Wincoop (2003a) implement a nonlinear estimation method, while 
Rose and van Wincoop (2002) rely instead on country dummies. 
 
8As noted in the introduction, the 1997 survey refers to a much smaller set of source 
countries; the newly-released results for end-2002 are still provisional and incomplete (and, 
at any rate, highly correlated with the end-2001 positions).   - 8 - 
 
A.   Specification 
In general, the specification equation (14) guides the empirical work. However, we augment 
this bilateral equation with equations that seek to explain the fixed effects i α  and  j α  
 
  ii i Hu α ρ = +  (15) 
 
  jj j Su α ρ = +  (16) 
 
where , ij HS  are vectors of country characteristics that explain variation in the aggregate 
levels of portfolio positions for host and source countries respectively. Most existing 
empirical work on the geographical allocation of equity holdings, such as Ahearne et al 
(2003) and Pinkowitz et al (2002), considers a single source country and cannot control for 
host-country fixed effects. Our broader data set allows us to adopt this more general 
approach. 
 
B.   Bilateral Factors 
In section II, we developed a benchmark allocation model in which bilateral portfolio 
positions are related to the level of bilateral. In addition, we highlighted that various 
informational and financial frictions may also influence bilateral allocations. 
 
In common with others (e.g. Portes and Rey 2003), we include an array of gravity-type 
variables to proxy for information costs. Since trade volume is directly included in the 
regression, these variables should exert an independent influence on portfolio positions only 
to the extent that they proxy for informational or other financial frictions.
9 We include in this 
list: distance; the time zone difference; common language; colonial relationship; a currency 
union dummy; a dummy for the existence of an investment tax treaty; and, as a general proxy 
for institutional similarity, a dummy for common origins to the legal system.
10  
 
In some specifications (albeit at the cost of a major reduction in sample size), we also include 
some bilateral financial correlations that may influence asset holdings in an incomplete-
markets environment. These include the correlation in stock market returns and the 
                                                 
9 In addition, the inclusion of these variables ensures that the estimated import effect is not 
driven by omitted variable bias, since these variables are naturally highly correlated with the 
volume of trade but may yet exert an independent influence on bilateral equity holdings. 
10 We additionally explored the contribution of telephone traffic and the level of bilateral 
migration as proxies for information flows. Both variables reduce sample size considerably, 
particularly the latter, which is available for only 8 countries (see Section V). Although each 
is significant in a bivariate regression, neither is significant in a multivariate setting.   - 9 - 
 
correlation in GDP growth rates.
11 In addition, following Davis et al (2001), we also include 
the correlation between the host-country stock market return and the source-country GDP 
growth rate to take into account the role of the host-country stock market in potentially 
hedging against source-country output fluctuations. In all cases, these correlations are 
calculated using historical data: since much of the foreign portfolio equity investment took 
place only since the mid-1990s, we are confident that the endogeneity of financial 
correlations to the level of bilateral financial holdings is not a major concern. However, as a 
robustness check, we also report instrumental-variables estimates that allow for the potential 
endogeneity of a number of regressors. 
 
 
C.   Source and Host Country Factors 
Our theoretical framework suggests that larger economies will have correspondingly larger 
international equity asset and liability positions. However, the size-holdings relation may be 
less than proportional: the gains to international risk-sharing may larger for a smaller 
country, due to the lesser scope for domestic diversification. In addition to economic size, 
according to the logic of our benchmark model, measures of aggregate trade openness should 
also be important in explaining aggregate international investment activity. 
 
In previous work, we have argued that a number of other characteristics can help explain 
variation in the levels of cross-border asset holdings (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2001a, 2001b, 
2003).
12 For instance, to the extent that there are fixed costs to overseas investment and that 
risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, we may expect richer countries to invest more overseas. 
Moreover, a well-developed domestic financial sector may also affect international 
investment through a variety of mechanisms. First, a large domestic financial sector 
facilitates international risk sharing by enabling the issuing of liabilities to foreign investors. 
Second, the accumulation of domestic financial assets and liabilities may increase the need to 
diversify overseas, especially if it increases exposure to domestic risk. Third, the 
sophistication that is acquired through domestic financial transactions may reduce the 
barriers to international investment. All those factors would lead us to expect a positive 
correlation between domestic financial market development and international asset holdings.  
 
However, a counter-argument is that, domestic investors may be more prone to invest 
overseas if investment opportunities in a shallow domestic financial market are scarce—
hence, for a given level of economic development, a shallower domestic financial market 
                                                 
11 We also examined the volatility of the bilateral real exchange rate. However, this had little 
explanatory power, being highly correlated with the set of host and source country fixed 
effects. 
12 Here, we examine separately the determinants of equity assets and equity liabilities. Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) consider the determinants of the sum of equity assets and 
liabilities, as a measure of general international financial integration.   - 10 - 
 
may be associated with higher asset holdings overseas. On the liability side, the size of the 
domestic financial market is a basic constraint on the scale of foreign portfolio liabilities: 
foreign portfolio equity investment in domestic public companies cannot exceed the size of 
the domestic stock market capitalization. 
 
A country’s history with capital controls may bind the level of foreign holdings: a country 
with a ‘natural’ potential to invest overseas may have an artificially small foreign asset 
position if capital controls are currently in place or have been in the recent past.  We also 
include a dummy for financial centers, to allow for the possibility that some holdings by 
intermediaries (rather than the ultimate owners) are included in the data. 
 
In addition to these structural characteristics, we also include historical measures of stock 
market risk and return that may help to explain the extent of home bias, if return-chasing is a 
driver of portfolio decisions. By this line of reasoning, investor in a country that historically 
offered a favorable domestic return-risk tradeoff may be less prone to invest overseas and 
may be a more popular destination for inward equity investment. 
 
IV.   DATA: DESCRIPTION AND ISSUES 
The dataset combines data on aggregate and bilateral international portfolio equity 
investment positions. Since 1997, the International Monetary Fund has published data on 
international investment positions for a number of countries: the coverage has expanded over 
time. With regard to bilateral data, the International Monetary Fund has also released two 
editions of its Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), for end-1997 (IMF, 2000) 
and end-2001.
14 For each participating country, the CPIS reports data on foreign portfolio 
asset holdings (divided into equity, long-term debt, and short-term debt) by residence of the 
issuer. The earlier survey covered 29 source countries, but some major investing nations 
(such as Germany) did not participate. The more recent survey is much broader, with 67 
source countries included, among those several offshore and financial centers. For each 
source, the survey reports holdings in up to 218 destination countries/territories.
15  
. 
The data are based on the residence principle adopted for balance of payments statistics (see 
IMF, 1993 for a description of the general principles). Problems with the CPIS data can arise 
for several reasons:  
 
                                                 
14  The data are available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm.  
15 For those countries that participated in both 1997 and 2001 surveys, there is considerable 
persistence in bilateral equity holdings. A log-log regression of 2001 equity positions on 
1997 observations gives an elasticity of 0.86 and an overall R-squared of 0.70.    - 11 - 
 
•  Incomplete country coverage. A number of countries did not participate to the CPIS. 
Among the likely largest holders of portfolio equity assets among non-participants are the 
British Virgin Islands, China, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan province of China, and the 
United Arab Emirates.  
 
•  Under-reporting of assets by CPIS participants. Under-reporting can be due to 
incomplete institutional coverage of the survey. For example, the Cayman Islands 
reported only portfolio holdings by the banking sector (and hence excluding its sizable 
mutual fund industry); the Bahamas also reported exclusively banking sector holdings, 
and the German survey did not cover holdings by households.
16 Under-reporting is also 
likely to occur for countries that experienced periods of substantial capital flight in the 
past (such as several Latin American countries) and, more generally, for assets held in 
offshore centers for tax shelter reasons.
 17  
 
•  Third-party holdings. Third party holdings refer to securities issued by country B and 
held in an institution residing in country C by a resident of country A. Third-party 
holdings do not pose a measurement problem when using end-investor surveys, but can 
lead to mismeasurement if the surveys are based on custodians (typically domestic ones, 
therefore missing assets held by foreign custodians on behalf of domestic residents). The 
United States uses a mix of both methods of survey.
18  
 
•  Problems in collection methods. For many countries this is the first participation to the 
CPIS, and therefore collection methods may still be inadequate.   
 
While these shortfalls need to be taken into account when examining the data, the CPIS  
provides a unique perspective on cross-country equity positions that warrants a detailed 
analysis.   
 
                                                 
16 For the Cayman Islands, its derived liabilities (themselves likely to be underestimated) 
exceed its reported assets by close to US$350 billion. For Germany, the portfolio assets 
reported in the CPIS survey (US$800 billion), are over US$200 billion lower than those 
reported in the International Investment Position (which are estimated making use of flow 
data, and therefore include household holdings as well).  
17 With regard to countries that experienced capital flight in the past, some of the gaps may 
be filled with the help of the United States’ survey of its portfolio liabilities, since a 
substantial portion of their assets may well be in the US. 
 
18 Griever, Lee, and Warnock (2001) discuss in detail the methodology of US surveys and 
Warnock and Cleaver (2002) highlight the measurement problems posed by third-party 
holdings.   - 12 - 
 
A.   Stylized facts of the 2001 CPIS: aggregate investment  
The total recorded level of portfolio equity investment in the CPIS was US$5.16 trillion. 
Table 1 lists the 10 largest foreign investors, both in absolute terms and as ratios of domestic 
GDP. In absolute levels, the largest foreign investors are the main OECD economies; a 
notable exception is Luxembourg, a very small economy with a large financial center. 
According to the CPIS, “external” equity holdings of euro area countries amount to US$893 
billion, while intra-euro area holdings are over US$800 billion. When comparing the CPIS 
equity holdings with those reported in these countries’ International Investment Position, the 
most notable discrepancy is for Germany that reports IIP equity assets totaling over US$500 
billion, well above the level in the survey.
19 
 
When scaling equity holdings by GDP, financial and offshore centers dominate the picture, 
with total assets amounting to multiples of their domestic output. Total reported portfolio 
equity investment by offshore centers and small economies with financial centers (including 
in the latter category Ireland, Luxembourg, Hong Kong S.A.R., and Singapore, but excluding 
Switzerland) amounts to over US$700 billion, notwithstanding the incomplete coverage of 
the survey highlighted in the previous sub-section.   
 
Table 2 lists the ten largest geographical destinations for portfolio equity investment. Here 
liabilities are derived from the asset claims of the countries that participated in the CPIS 
survey, and therefore provide a somewhat incomplete picture of total portfolio equity 
liabilities. For sake of comparison, the first column reports in brackets the total amount of 
portfolio equity liabilities reported by countries in their International Investment Position. 
The overall pattern is similar to the one for assets—the largest OECD economies are the 
main destination countries for portfolio equity investment.  
 
In terms of ratios to GDP, small economies with financial centers dominate the picture. 
These centers are very important in absolute terms as well, as highlighted by the presence of 
Luxembourg and Bermuda among the main destination countries. The total amount of 
derived equity liabilities of offshore centers and small economies with financial centers is 
US$870 billion. It is not surprising that this number is larger than reported offshore center 
assets, even though holdings in offshore centers by foreign residents are clearly under-
reported.  First, not all offshore centers participated in the CPIS; and second, the derived 
equity liabilities of these centers often represent shares in mutual funds, that may invest these 
funds in portfolio debt instruments, and not exclusively in equities. 
  
B.   Stylized facts of the 2001 CPIS: bilateral investment patterns  
In order to put the geographical distribution of portfolio equity asset holdings in perspective, 
Table 3 provides a brief summary of the size of economies, their stock markets, and the share 
of domestic stocks owned by non residents. A couple of interesting stylized facts emerge 
                                                 
19 This difference is reflected in the euro area’s total holdings—those estimated from the 
survey are US$100 billion less than those reported in the euro area’s IIP.    - 13 - 
 
from this table. First, at end-2001 exchange rates and prices, the United Kingdom and the 
United States’ stock market capitalization largely exceeded their aggregate weight in world 
GDP. Second, the fraction of the domestic stock market held by non-resident portfolio 
investors was substantially higher in the euro area and the United Kingdom (over a third) 
than in the United States and Japan (13 and 17 percent, respectively). 
20 
 
Table 4 summarizes the geographical distribution of portfolio equity investment among the 
main advanced economies by comparing the share of foreign equity investment in the host 
country with the share of the host country’s stock market capitalization in the rest of the 
world’s stock market capitalization. We use the latter as a simple predictive benchmark for 
the allocation of foreign portfolio equity investment. Japan’s foreign equity investment is the 
most closely aligned with the benchmark, while the least closely aligned is the United 
Kingdom, which invests much more in the euro area than in the United States. The euro area 
has higher than predicted investment in the rest of the world and especially in the United 
Kingdom, and lower than predicted investment in Japan and the United States. Finally, the 
United States is “overweight” in the United Kingdom and the rest of the world, and 
underweight in the euro area and especially in Japan.  
 
Figure 1 summarizes the degree of “foreign bias” for a restricted sample of OECD host and 
source countries, as well as for the whole sample. The foreign bias is a measure of the 
deviation of a source country’s equity holdings in a given host from an international 
benchmark, and is defined as FORBIAS=[1- (equity holdings ratio/market value ratio)]. The 
market value ratio is the ratio of host country’s stock market capitalization to world stock 
market capitalization net of the source country, while the equity holdings ratio is the ratio of 
equity holdings by the source country in the host country to total equity holdings of the 
source country. If source country holdings in the host country simply reflect the relative 
weight of the host country in the world’s stock market capitalization, the bias is equal to zero. 
If equity holdings are higher than the market ratio, the bias is positive, and viceversa.  
 
The Figure shows the percentage of total observations for which the foreign bias falls within 
a given range, and shows that the degree of dispersion is substantial, especially for the whole 
sample. While for some advanced economies the equity holdings ratio lines up quite closely 
with the market value ratio, this dispersion warrants a closer look at other determinants of 
bilateral investment patterns. 
 
 
V.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
We focus on explaining the portfolio equity positions for end-2001. In line with the 
discussion above, we report results for three different dependent variables: bilateral positions; 
                                                 
20 Note that Table 3 only reports domestic shares owned by portfolio equity investors (who 
by definition hold participations below 10 percent). Adding the shares held by direct 
investors would increase the measured size of non-resident ownership of domestic shares.   - 14 - 
 
aggregate asset positions; and aggregate liability positions. We consider a wide range of 
explanatory variables in our empirical analysis. The data appendix describes the data sources 
and construction methods for these variables.  
 
A.   The Determinants of Bilateral Equity Holdings 
Regression Specification and Estimation Procedures 
 
In Tables 5-7, we present results of panel regressions of equity holdings for three samples: all 
countries, OECD source countries, and emerging market source countries. The same set of 




The dependent variable is specified as log(1+equity), so as to explicitly account for the large 
number of observations equal to zero.
22 All regressions control for both fixed source and host 
country effects—hence the only explanatory variables included in the regression are those 
that have variation along both sample dimensions.
23 Because of the log specification of the 
regressions, adopted in line with the literature on gravity models, the effect of variables such 
as the (log) product of host and source country area, population, GDP, etc. are automatically 
soaked up by the fixed host and source effects.  
 
All regressions exclude source and host offshore and small financial centers. 
25 This choice is 
motivated by the fact that these centers act as pure intermediaries, and are neither true 
                                                 
21 Results for restricted sets of destination countries (e.g. only OECD destinations; only 
emerging market destinations) are available from the authors upon request. 
22 Table A1 presents summary statistics on available observations for equity holdings, as well 
as number of observations equal to zero, for all samples and regression specifications. Since 
equity positions are measured in dollars, adding 1 dollar to the equity position is trivially not 
distortionary: it just allows us to include the zero observations in the regressions in the log 
specification. 
23 The tables report both the overall adjusted R
2 (which includes the explanatory power of the 
source and host country dummies) and the bilateral R
2 (which measures the marginal 
explanatory power of the bilateral variables). While the host and source country dummies are 
very important, the bilateral variables also contribute considerable explanatory power. In the 
broadest specification (column (3) in Tables 5-7), the bilateral R
2 is in the range (0.23-0.33). 
25 Among the source countries, these are Aruba, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, Cayman 
Islands, Cyprus, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Macao SAR, Malta, 
Mauritius, the Netherlands Antilles, Panama, and Vanuatu. A complete data appendix with a 
list of countries and territories for each sample is available from the authors upon request.   - 15 - 
 
sources nor final destinations of investment. Ideally, we would wish to “re-allocate” the 
funds invested by source economies in offshore centers to their ultimate destination. 
However, this type of exercise is fraught with uncertainty, also given the limited available 
information on the pattern of investment of certain offshore centers. Nevertheless, to the 
extent that every dollar invested by a source country in an offshore center is invested by the 
offshore center in the same way as the average dollar invested abroad by the source country, 
the exclusion of offshore centers is of no consequence to the empirical analysis. This is the 
case since re-allocating holdings in offshore centers to their ultimate destinations would 
affect bilateral holdings only up to a common factor of proportionality. Given that the 
regressions are run in log form, this factor of proportionality would be soaked up by the fixed 
source-country effects. In any case, the exclusion of several offshore centers is unavoidable, 
given the lack of data on macroeconomic variables, bilateral trade, and stock market 
capitalization and returns. 
 
In each table, columns (1)-(3) report panel OLS regressions with fixed source and host 
effects; column (4) reports IV estimates; while columns (5)-(7) Tobit regressions. Although, 
for timing and scale reasons, we are generally skeptical that reverse causation from equity 
holdings to the regressors is an important problem, the IV estimates are included to guard 
against possible reverse causation running from financial holdings to a number of 
regressors.
26 The Tobit estimates are included in light of the fact that a large number of 
bilateral observations is equal to zero and allow for the possibility that the observed 
distribution of equity holdings is censored at zero.
27 Such censoring is plausible,  given the 
restrictions on shorting equity holdings in many countries.  
 
Columns (1) and (5) present results using only source-country imports from the host country, 
measured as log(1+imports), as an explanatory variable. This partial specification allows the 
use of the widest possible sample: 50 sources and 172 hosts. Columns (2) and (6) add to the 
explanatory variables a number of proxies for information barriers and ‘cultural’ distance that 
have been widely used in the literature attempting to explain trade and capital flows with 
gravity models.
28 These include: the log of geographical distance; the time difference (to 
proxy for the difficulties of communication when the overlap between office hours is limited, 
                                                 
26 The bulk of equity holdings were accumulated only over the last decade and remain 
comparatively small, whereas import patterns (for instance) are quite persistent.  
27 It is well known that Tobit panel estimation with fixed effects can give rise to biased and 
inconsistent estimates, due to the incidental parameters problem. However, Greene (2003) 
shows that Tobit estimates in practice are more reliable than least-squares estimates if 
censoring is a significant data problem. We do not attempt to estimate an IV-Tobit 
specification, in view of the stringent assumptions required to implement such a procedure 
(Honore and Hu 2003). 
28 See, for example, Frankel and Rose (2002). See, among others, Portes and Rey (2003) and 
Rose and Spiegel (2002) on the application of gravity models to capital flows.    - 16 - 
 
as suggested by Portes and Rey (2003) and Stein and Daude (2003)); a dummy for countries 
that have been in a colonial relation; a dummy for countries in a strict currency union; a 
dummy for a common language; and a dummy for countries with a tax treaty established 
prior to 1999. In addition, columns (2) and (6) also include the correlation in GDP growth 
rates between the source and host country, as a widely-available proxy for the gains from 
bilateral diversification, along the lines of Davis et al (2001). As highlighted in Table A1, the 
addition of these variables reduces the full sample size by about 20 percent (15 host countries 
are dropped), with the large majority of the dropped observations reflect equity holdings 
equal to zero. 
 
Finally, regressions (3), (4) and (7) also add the correlation between stock market returns in 
the source and host country (measured in US dollars); the correlation between source-country 
GDP and host-country equity returns (following Davis et al (2001)); and a dummy for 
common legal origin. The first two variables are further proxies for the gains to bilateral 
diversification, while the latter variable is a general proxy for similarity in institutions.
29  
 
Adding these variables reduces the number of observations substantially—data for the whole 
sample now cover 37 sources and 48 hosts, and two thirds of the observations are dropped 
with respect to the specification of columns (2)-(5). However, once again the majority of the 
dropped observations reflect equity holdings equal to zero, and the size of total equity assets 
included in the regressions drops by a trivial amount (less than 1 percent).  
 
For the full sample and the OECD sub-sample (Tables 5 and 6), in the IV estimation in 
column (4), we treat as potentially endogenous variables: the level of imports; the correlation 
of GDP growth rates; the correlation of stock returns; and the correlation between domestic 
GDP growth and the foreign stock return. Our instrument list consists of: distance; the time 
difference; a border dummy; the lagged correlation in GDP growth rates; the lagged 
correlation in stock returns; and the lagged correlation between domestic GDP growth and 
the foreign stock return.
30  For the emerging market sub-sample (Table 7), including lagged 
stock returns would lead to a sharp drop in data availability (many emerging market stock 
markets become active only in the mid-1990s). For this reason, we only treat the level of 
imports and the correlation of GDP growth rates as potentially endogenous variables and 
                                                 
29 The common legal origin dummy is only available for approximately the same set of 
countries for which stock market return data are available. 
30 We assume that the correlations between growth rates prior to 1990 as well as the 
correlation between stock returns prior to 1995 are exogenous with respect to 2001 equity 
holdings, which reflect to a substantial degree the large flows of the period 1995-2001. For 
this reason we use lagged correlations, which have an “exogenous” overlap with the 
instrumented variables, as instruments.    - 17 - 
 
drop the lagged correlation in stock returns and the lagged correlation between domestic 
GDP growth and the foreign stock return from the list of instruments in this case.
31  
 
Note that, in the IV specification, we drop distance and the time difference from the list of 
independent variables in the main regression and allow these variables to influence bilateral 
equity holdings through their effect on the endogenous regressors. The excludability of 
distance from the main regression is based on the OLS results for the comparable 
specification in column (3): although distance is significant at the 5 percent level in the full 
sample, it is not significant in the OECD or the emerging market sub-samples. While the 
time difference variable is significant at the 1 percent level for the emerging market sub-
sample in column (3) of Table 7, it is not significant for the OECD sub-sample and 




Across Tables 5-7, the most striking result is the strong link between bilateral imports and 
bilateral investment holdings (columns (1) and (5)) which, not surprisingly, shows up with a 
much higher coefficient in the Tobit regressions.
32 The strength of this bivariate relation is 
quite noteworthy and consistent with the model laid out in section II. That the point estimate 
is below the theoretical value of unity can be attributed to a number of factors. First, 
measurement error in imports imparts a downward bias to the coefficient estimate. Second, 
holding destination X’s equity is not the only route to gain exposure to import-related risk: a 
complementary route would be to invest in domestic firms with overseas operations in those 
markets (Cai and Warnock 2004). Third, the composition of destination X’s stock market 
index may not perfectly reflect import risk (e.g. it may include domestically-orientated 
firms). Fourth, in some cases, imports from country X may consist of generic commodities 
for which country X’s stock market would not be the appropriate hedging mechanism. 
 
It is possible that the level of imports may simply proxy for bilateral information flows, 
rather than reflecting the risk-sharing mechanism outlined in our baseline theoretical model. 
However, the imports variable remains robustly significant (although its point estimate is 
reduced), once the set of gravity-related regressors that may proxy for informational linkages 
are included in the specification. Moreover, if the informational role for trade is dominant, 
exports should play a similar role to imports in explaining bilateral equity holdings: however, 
holding fixed bilateral imports, bilateral exports has no additional explanatory power for the 
                                                 
31 The results are little changed if use a smaller sample and run the same IV specification as 
for the full sample and the OECD sample. 
32 Figure 2 shows the scatter plot of equity positions against imports. The simple pooled 
regression generates an elasticity of 0.39 (t-statistic of 22.2), with an R-squared of 0.18. The 
deviation from the unitary coefficient that is predicted by the model in section II may be in 
part attributable to measurement error.   - 18 - 
 
whole sample and emerging markets, and an economically weaker and statistically less 
significant impact than imports for the OECD sample.
33  
 
The importance of trade here stands in contrast to the evidence of Ahearne et al (2003) for 
the US pattern of overseas investment: using 1997 data, they find no role for bilateral trade in 
explaining the bilateral equity holdings of US investors.
34 The only case in which the imports 
variable loses significance is for the emerging-market sub-sample in the regressions 
including the financial correlations in columns (3) and (7) in Table 7: these regressions have 
a much smaller set of observations. Moreover, even for this specification, imports remain 
highly significant in the IV estimation in column (4). 
 
The results also lend considerable support to the role of informational linkages in explaining 
bilateral asset holdings: a number of the cultural and physical proximity variables are 
statistically and economically significant. Taking first the ‘broad’ sample in columns (2) and 
(7), distance is robustly significant in all three samples: it is also interesting to note that its 
impact is more powerful for investors from emerging markets than for investors from OECD 
countries. The full sample OLS estimate in column (2) of Table 5 indicates that, all else 
equal, doubling the physical distance reduces equity holdings by 61 percent for the whole 
sample. Also, speaking a common language raises equity holdings by about 40 percent.
 35 
The colony dummy is also positive and significant for both the OECD and emerging market 
sub-samples, and particularly large for the latter group, where a common colonial history is 
associated with a quadrupling of equity investment.  
 
The currency union dummy is large and very significant for the full sample in the OLS panel 
regression, but not in the remaining sub-samples and in the Tobit regressions. This suggests 
that the variable is useful in distinguishing between zero and nonzero observations for equity 
holdings in the full sample, but has no independent explanatory power in explaining the size 
of desired equity holdings. In the broad sample, the tax treaty variable is significantly 
positive only in the Tobit estimates for the emerging market sample.  
 
The correlation between GDP growth rates is significantly positive for both the full sample 
and the OECD subsample, under both OLS and Tobit estimation procedures. To the extent 
that the output growth correlation is a proxy for the gains from diversification, its positive 
                                                 
33 The results including bilateral exports are available upon request. 
34 Their specification includes a different array of control variables and, of course, cannot 
control for fixed host country effects. They also measure trade as a ratio to the host country’s 
GDP.  
35 Yildirim (2003) reports similar findings for distance and language, in a specification 
without country and host fixed effects. She also considers a variety of corporate governance 
indicators, whose effects in our specification are soaked up by the source and host dummies.   - 19 - 
 
sign is unexpected: rather, it seems that investors hold equity in destinations with similar 
business cycles.  
 
When stock market-related variables and the common legal origin dummy are added to the 
regressions (columns (3), (4) and (7) in Tables 5-7), there is a notable change in some of the 
results, related primarily to the change in sample size.
36 For this narrower sample, the most 
remarkable change is in the coefficient on distance, which is dramatically reduced in size and 
loses statistical significance in the OECD and emerging market sub-samples. Since the main 
difference between the samples in column (2) and (3) are observations with equity holdings 
close to or equal to zero, this suggests that—once we control for trade—distance helps 
predict whether a given source country is going to invest in a given host country, rather than 
the size of the investment. The results on the distance variable differ from those in Portes and 
Rey (2003): one interpretation is that the information frictions captured by distance may 




A second difference is that currency union dummy is now quite significant for the OECD 
subsample: according to the OLS estimates, a source country tends to invest 60 percent more 
in a host which participates in the same currency union. Another is that the tax treaty dummy 
is now significantly negative for the OECD and full samples (but not in the Tobit case for the 
latter), while remaining significantly positive at the 10 percent level for the emerging market 
sub-sample in column (7) of Table 7. As emphasized by Blonigen and Davies (2002) in the 
context of foreign direct investment, the expected sign of the tax treaty variable is a priori 
ambiguous: while on the one side a tax treaty reduces the likelihood of double taxation, and 
hence encourages foreign equity investment, on the other it makes it more difficult to evade 
taxes on equity returns and hence may discourage investment. 
 
                                                 
36 Results for the regression specification in columns (2)-(5) for the same sample as (3)-(6) 
give results that are very similar to those reported in (3)-(6). These are available from the 
authors upon request. 
37 The correlation between bilateral equity holdings and bilateral equity flows is significantly 
positive at 0.55 for the 14 country sample examined by Portes and Rey (2003). (We thank the 
authors and Capital Data for providing us with their data.) Following Portes and Rey (2003), 
we also examined bilateral telephone traffic as an information variable but found it to be 
insignificant once trade is included as a regressor. For the small number of countries with 
available data, we also tried the share of immigrants from the host country in the source 
country’s population but this variable was also insignificant. 
38 Distance remains statistically significant in the Tobit regression for emerging markets 
(column (6)), albeit not in the OLS panel regression. This suggests that for emerging markets 
sources it has more power to discriminate between positive equity holdings than between 
zero and nonzero holdings, contrary to what happens for OECD sources.   - 20 - 
 
For the full sample, the evidence from this smaller set of observations also suggests that 
source countries tend to invest in hosts with similar characteristics, rather than in countries 
yielding more risk diversification—for the full sample, the coefficients on the correlation 
between growth rates, the correlation of stock returns, and the correlation between growth 
and stock returns are all positive and significant in the OLS, IV and Tobit regressions.
39 
However, these variables are not significant for either the OECD or emerging market sub-
samples.  
 
Finally, there is evidence that institutional proximity is important for bilateral equity 
investment: for both OLS and Tobit specifications (albeit not for the IV regressions), 
countries tend to invest 30-40 percent more in hosts that have a similar legal background—a 
result which is common across the three samples.  
 
In sum, the geography of bilateral portfolio equity holdings is strongly related to bilateral 
trade, but also to proxies for informational asymmetries and cultural-institutional proximity, 
such as a common language and a common legal origin. The impact of distance variables is 
weakened once we the sample is restricted to the major equity sources and destinations. 
Among OECD countries, a common currency, which captures primarily the effects of the 
European Monetary Union, is associated with higher equity investment. More generally, the 
evidence points to bilateral equity investment taking place between countries with similar 
characteristics, including coordinated business cycles and correlated stock market returns, 
against the predictions of standard diversification arguments. 
 
B.   Aggregate Asset Positions 
We turn next to examining factors explaining the overall size of countries’ portfolio 
investment holdings. Results are presented in Table 9. From the initial sample of 67 sources 
we exclude the 17 offshore/small financial centers (see sub-section A). Among the variables 
explaining cross-country heterogeneity in total external asset holdings, we start in column (1) 
with a minimum set of variables that includes the size of the domestic economy, its GDP per 
capita, total exports of goods and services, the size of the domestic stock market, a measure 
of capital controls, and a dummy for financial centers.
40 This set of variables restricts our 
                                                 
39 Portes and Rey (2003) find that the covariance of stock returns has a positive impact on 
bilateral equity flows if distance is excluded from the regression, but turns negative once 
distance is included. However, in our case, the correlation remains positive even if distance is 
held fixed. (The results are similar whether we use covariances or correlations. A similar 
picture applies when we consider real local returns, rather than real dollar returns.) 
40 Financial centers in the sample are Hong Kong S.A.R, Ireland, Singapore, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom. In addition to acting as financial centers, these countries have 
domestic stock markets which are ‘final’ destinations for foreign portfolio investment.   - 21 - 
 
sample size to 48, on account of lack of data on domestic stock market capitalization for 
Costa Rica and Uruguay.  
 
In columns (1)-(3), the dependent variable is the fixed source-country effect estimated from a 
multi-variate regression of bilateral equity shares bilateral explanatory variables (Table 5, 
column 2), in line with our theoretical approach (equation (15) in Section II.A). To check 
robustness, in columns (4)-(6) we present instead results using as dependent variable the 
overall stock of portfolio assets, taken to be the highest between the one reported in the 2001 
CPIS survey and the one reported in the International Investment Position.
42  
 
Overall, results using the estimated fixed effect or the actual stock of equity holdings are 
similar: the dominant factors explaining equity asset positions are clearly GDP per capita and 
the size of the domestic stock market. For the former, the elasticity is just below one using 
the fixed effect specification, and higher in the regression using actual equity holdings, which 
does not incorporate the role of bilateral factors. For the latter, the elasticity is consistently 
estimated at around ½ . The importance of domestic stock market development in explaining 
foreign equity investment is in line with the findings of Di Giovanni (2004), who highlights 
that countries with more developed domestic financial market are more likely to engage in 
mergers and acquisitions operations abroad. 
 
While our measure of capital controls has a strong negative correlation with external 
portfolio equity holdings, it loses significance in the multivariate regression, particularly on 
account of its strong collinearity with GDP per capita.
43 Also, the financial center dummy, 
while consistently positive, is always statistically insignificant, suggesting that the features of 
financial centers relevant for overall asset holdings are already captured by other explanatory 
variables. Columns (2) and (5) add the domestic stock market’s Sharpe ratio, calculated over 
the period 1980-1996, among the explanatory variables. Its coefficient is statistically 
insignificant. Columns (3) and (6) add instead the country’s “beta” vis-à-vis the MSCI world 
return index, together with the standard deviation of the residual from the beta regression as a 
                                                 
42 Countries where the largest differences between the CPIS and the IIP arise are Germany, 
where the IIP reports higher portfolio equity assets (see discussion in the previous section), 
and Romania, which reports trivial holdings in the CPIS but over $1 billion in the IIP.  
43 The measure of controls used here is an average over the period 1996-2001 of an index of 
restrictions on capital market securities constructed by Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) and 
Johnston and others (1999).    - 22 - 
 
measure of stock return volatility. 
44 While the beta measure is not statistically significant, 
there is evidence that higher volatility of domestic stock returns reduces outward equity 
investment.    
 
In sum, our results suggest that the overall level of development and the depth of the 
domestic financial market, as reflected by stock market capitalization and low volatility, are 
reflected in increased external diversification—richer countries and those with a stronger 
“equity culture” hold larger gross foreign equity positions.   
 
C.   Aggregate Liability Positions 
The final empirical results we present refer to aggregate portfolio equity liabilities. In order 
to explain what makes countries attractive as a destination for non-resident portfolio equity 
investors, we use a similar set of explanatory variables as those used for explaining asset 
holdings. One addition is a dummy for Middle-Eastern countries, which is added because the 
largest holders of equity assets in the region (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) 
did not participate in the CPIS. If we assume that proximity matters for portfolio equity 
investment (either through trade connections or for informational reasons), the derived 
liabilities for countries in the Middle-Eastern region are likely to substantially under-estimate 
their total external equity liabilities.  
 
The overall sample size is constrained by the availability of domestic stock market 
capitalization data, which reduces the sample from 218 countries/territories for which we 
have data on derived equity liabilities to 65.
46 As the dependent variable, in regressions (1)-
                                                 
44 Missing observations for the Sharpe ratio and beta include Bulgaria, Estonia, Iceland, 
Israel, Kazakhstan, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Ukraine, in addition to those already 
listed previously.  
46 In addition to countries in the sample used for equity assets, we have data on derived 
liabilities, stock market capitalization, and capital controls for 17 countries/territories that did 
not participate in the 2001 CPIS. These are Bangladesh*, Bolivia*, China, Croatia*, India, 
Iran*, Jordan, Latvia*, Lithuania*, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan*, Peru, Saudi Arabia*, 
Slovenia*, Sri Lanka, and Trinidad and Tobago*. For countries denoted with an asterisk we 
have no data for the Sharpe ratio or beta—these are therefore excluded from the regressions 
in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) of Table 10.    - 23 - 
 
(3) we use the fixed host-country effect estimated from the regression of log bilateral equity 
shares on log source imports, in line with our theoretical approach (see equation (20) in 
Section II.A). To check robustness, in columns (4)-(6), we present instead results using as the 
dependent variable the overall stock of portfolio liabilities, taken to be the highest between 
the one reported in the 2001 CPIS survey and the one reported in the International 
Investment Position. 
47 Unlike asset holdings, liabilities are not measured directly by the 
CPIS, but can be derived by summing the asset holdings that participating countries report in 
each destination country. 
 
The results, which are presented in Table 10, are mostly similar between the specification 
using the fixed effect as explanatory variable and the one using measured equity liabilities. In 
particular, the size of the host country’s domestic stock market is the key correlate of 
portfolio equity liabilities. However, the elasticity is well below unity, especially in the fixed 
effect regressions—according to the point estimate, a 10 percent increase in the size of the 
domestic stock market is accompanied by a 5 to 7 percent increase in foreign equity 
liabilities. Also, the financial center and Middle-Eastern dummies are highly significant, with 
the expected sign. For example, other things being equal the stock of portfolio equity 
liabilities of financial centers is twice as large as in other countries. The level of GDP per 
capita is significant in regressions (4)-(6), but not in the fixed effect regressions, suggesting 
that its impact is captured by the variables explaining bilateral holdings. The index of 
controls on capital inflows is strongly negatively correlated with total equity liabilities, but is 
statistically insignificant in all multi-variate regressions. The failure to obtain stronger results 
is probably related on the one side to the difficulty in accurately measuring restrictions on 
foreign equity investment, and on the other to the collinearity of this variable with stock 
market development and GDP per capita.. The Sharpe ratio (columns (2) and (5)) and the 
“beta” and volatility measure of the domestic stock market are all statistically insignificant.
48  
 
For columns (4)-(6), the last row of the Table reports the fit of the regression when the 
dependent variable is the log share of the domestic stock market owned by foreigners.
49 As 
for asset regressions, we also experimented with a host of other potential explanatory 
variables, including inflation and real exchange rate volatility, alternative measures of capital 
controls (from Quinn (1997)), transaction costs on domestic stock markets (from Elkins-
McSherry), legal origin (from La Porta and al. (2003)), and indicators of securities’ laws 
                                                 
47 Results are broadly similar when we restrict the sample to countries that report their IIP or 
when we use the CPIS derived liabilities as dependent variable.   
48 These variables remain statistically insignificant even when calculated over a more recent 
period (1995-2001). 
49 In these regressions, the estimated coefficients for stock market capitalization are one 
minus the point estimates from the baseline specifications, and they are all significant at the 5 
percent level.   - 24 - 
 
(also from La Porta et al. (2003)). While these variables are all correlated with the stock of 




VI.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper makes use of a new dataset on bilateral portfolio equity investment, which covers 
a very significant number of the largest portfolio equity investor countries, including offshore 
centers. A stylized theoretical model, based on trade costs, provides a simple framework for 
analyzing cross-country portfolio investment patterns. The theoretical framework informs the  
empirical analysis, which highlights key correlates of bilateral equity investment patterns, as 
well as of aggregate portfolio equity assets and liabilities. The most striking result is that  
bilateral equity investment is strongly correlated with the underlying patterns of trade in 
goods. However, informational linkages are also important, such as a common language and 
common legal origins. The overall size of portfolio equity investment abroad is increasing in 
the level of development and the depth of the domestic financial market—richer countries 
and those with a stronger “equity culture” hold larger gross foreign equity positions. The size 
of the host country’s domestic stock market is the key correlate of aggregate foreign portfolio 
equity liabilities. 
 
There are several directions for future research. One important issue is the role of offshore 
centers. Table A2 offers some initial ‘geographical’ perspective on the size of investment in 
offshore and financial centers: it lists, for the main international investors, the amount of 
equity assets held in offshore and financial centers, and the amount of derived liabilities to 
these centers. For example, assets held in offshore and financial centers are over 40 percent 
of total portfolio equity assets for Belgium and Italy, and over 25 percent in Germany (almost 
entirely reflecting holdings in Luxembourg). Derived liabilities to offshore and financial 
centers are also significant, albeit less dramatically so in proportion to total derived 
liabilities. Devising methods to allocate, albeit roughly, equity investment in offshore centers 
to their ultimate destination is an important, if difficult, research objective.  
 
Another avenue for research consists in developing the economic implications of the 
asymmetries in the geographical portfolio allocations that have been highlighted in this 
paper. For instance, these data may be employed to calculate the differential wealth impact 
across source countries of a financial shock such as a decline in the US stock market: those 
countries with greater exposures to the US clearly suffer a greater loss. In addition, 
                                                 
50 Other potential determinants of aggregate equity positions considered in the literature are 
corporate governance variables (Yildirim (2003)), the impact of listing on international 
exchanges (Ahearne et al. (2003)), the share of market capitalization held by insiders (Edison 
and Warnock (2003b), and psycho-cultural factors such the degree of patriotism (Morse and 
Shive (2003)). 
52 Imbs (2004a, 2004b) makes some progress on these questions.   - 25 - 
 
asymmetries in investment positions also have implications for the behavior of bilateral 
exchange rates: the bilateral exchange rate response to a given shock should be affected by 
the degree of bilateral financial integration. More broadly, these data are an alternative 
source in examining whether bilateral financial integration affects other bilateral economic 
relations.
52  Of course, establishing lines of causality between financial and other linkages is 
a challenging task.  
 
Further, it would be interesting to conduct a comparative analysis across different asset 
classes, including portfolio debt allocations; bank loans and deposits; and FDI positions. This 
would allow to provide a more comprehensive account of the various components of the 
geography of international investment positions and gain further insight into the ‘external 
capital structure’ of nations. 
 
At a more speculative level, it is also worth exploring whether the bilateral pattern of 
investment also influences aggregate economic variables: for instance, does ‘financial 
remoteness’ or the composition of the investor base affect the level of aggregate investment, 
the cost of capital and the stability of capital flows?    - 26 - 
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A.   Countries and regions participating in the 2001 Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey: 
 
Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guernsey, Hong 
Kong SAR of China, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Jersey, Kazakhstan, republic of Korea, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Macao SAR of 
China, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, 
Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela.  
 
B.   Variables: sources and definitions 
Bilateral portfolio equity holdings: Portfolio equity instruments issued by host country  
residents and held by source country residents. Source: 2001 Coordinated Portfolio 
Survey.  
 
Total portfolio equity holdings, CPIS: Total portfolio equity holdings held by source 
country residents as reported in the 2001 Coordinated Portfolio Survey.  
 
Total portfolio equity assets and liabilities, IIP:  Total portfolio equity assets and 
liabilities reported in countries’ International Investment Position. Source: International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and national sources. 
 
Source-country imports: Imports of goods by source countries from host countries 
(average 1997-2001). Source, International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.  
 
Log distance: logarithm of Great Circle distance in miles between the capital cities of 
source and host country. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2002).  
 
Time difference: absolute value of time difference between source and host country 
(ranging from 1 to 12). Source:  
 
Common Language: dummy taking the value of 1 if source and host country share a 
common language. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2002). 
 
Colony dummy: dummy taking the value of 1 if source and host country ever had a 
colonial relationship. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2002). 
 
Strict Currency Union: dummy taking the value of 1 if source and host country are in a 
currency union. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2002). 
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Tax treaty: dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the source and host country have a 
tax treaty enacted prior to 1999. Source: authors’ elaborations based on treaty data taken 
from www.unctad.org. 
 
Common legal origin: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source and host countries 
have a legal system with a common origin (common law, French, German, or 
Scandinavian). Source: authors’ elaborations based on La Porta, López de Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2003).  
 
Correlation of stock returns: Correlation between the stock market returns of the host 
and source country, expressed in US dollars. Source; authors’ calculations based on 
returns data from Datastream and Morgan Stanley Capital International. 
 
Correlation in growth rates: correlation between the GDP growth rate in the source and 
host country. Source: authors’ calculations based on World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
 
Correlation growth-stock return: correlation between GDP growth in the source 
country and real stock returns in the host country, 1980-99. Source: authors’ calculations 
based on Datastream, Morgan Stanley Capital International, and World Development 
Indicators. 
 
Real exchange rate volatility Volatility of the bilateral real exchange rate index between 
the source and the host country for the period . Source: authors’ calculations based on 
International Monetary Fund, Information Notice System. 
 
Log GDP: Log of 2001 GDP level in current US dollars. Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
 
Log GDP per capita: Log of 2001 GDP per capita level in current US dollars. Source: 
World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
Log domestic stock market capitalization: log of the domestic stock market 
capitalization in US dollars as of end-2001. Sources: Datastream, Morgan Stanley Capital 
International, national sources. 
 
Capital controls (equity assets): Index of restrictions on transactions in capital market 
securities, 1996-2001. Source: Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) and Johnston and others 
(1999). 
 
Capital controls (equity liabilities): Index of restrictions on capital inflows, 1996-2001. 
Source: Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) and Johnston and others (1999). 
 
Financial center dummy: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country or 
territory is a ‘large’ international financial center.  
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Sharpe ratio: average excess return of the country stock market relative to world returns, 
divided by the standard deviation of the excess return’s variability. Source: authors’ 
calculations based on Datastream and Morgan Stanley Capital International. 
 
Beta: coefficient on regression of real US$ stock returns on world stock returns for the 
period 1980-1996. Source: authors’ calculations based on Datastream and Morgan 
Stanley Capital International. 
 
SD of beta residual: Standard deviation of the residual from the beta regression of stock 
returns. Source: authors’ calculations based on Datastream and Morgan Stanley Capital 
International. 
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Table 1. Largest holders of portfolio equity assets* 
 
Largest asset holdings 
(US$ billion) 
Largest asset holdings 
 (ratio of GDP) 
United States  1613 Luxembourg  16.6 
United Kingdom  558 Jersey  14.8 
Germany  381 Guernsey  13.5 
Luxembourg  319  Isle of Man  9.6 
Switzerland  247 Bermuda  8.6 
Italy  239 Netherlands  Antilles  2.2 
Netherlands  235 Ireland  1.3 
Japan  227 Bahamas  1.1 
France   202 Switzerland  1.0 
Canada  199 Netherlands    0.61 




Table 2. Largest holders of portfolio equity liabilities*  
 
Largest derived liabilities 
US$ billion 
(reported IIP equity liabilities in brackets) 
Largest derived liabilities  
(ratio of GDP) 
United States  1000 (1533)  Cayman Islands  78.5 
United Kingdom  711  (768)  Bermuda  43.7 
France  387 (416)  Virgin Islands, British  28.7 
Luxembourg  376  (N.A.)  Luxembourg  19.5 
Japan  330  (376)  Netherlands Antilles  8.3 
Netherlands 287  (284)  Guernsey  4.3 
Germany  273  (296)  Jersey  2.2 
Switzerland  201  (322)  Dominica  1.7 
Bermuda  157  (N.A.)  Bahamas  1.1 
Italy  119  (35)  Gibraltar  1.0 
* The numbers in brackets in the first column are the total portfolio equity liabilities as reported 
by countries in their International Investment Position (IIP). The 2001 equity liabilities of the 




Table 3. Summary statistics on stock market size and foreign ownership (2001) 
 




market cap. in 
percent of world 
stock market cap. 
Percent of domestic 
stock market cap. 
owned by foreign 
portfolio investors 
Domestic GDP in 
percent of world 
GDP 
Euro  area  15.9 36.5 19.6 
Japan    9.3  16.7  13.4 
United Kingdom   8.9  35.6   4.6 
United  States  48.9 12.9 32.3 
Other  17.0 N.A. 30.1 
Note: world stock market capitalization is calculated as the sum of stock market 
capitalization of 71 countries in the sample. In this calculation, holdings of shares by 
residents of one euro area country in another are considered domestic holdings.  
 
 
Table 4. Foreign portfolio equity investment: actual and predicted shares * 
 




     Source country 
 
Host country   
Theor. share  17.5% 17.5% 31.1%
Euro area  Actual share  16.8% 43.7% 28.6%
Theor. share  11.0% 10.2% 18.1%
Japan  Actual share  7.3% 9.9% 10.6%
Theor. share  10.6% 9.8%  17.4%
United Kingdom  Actual share  22.2% 13.0%  21.7%
Theor. share  58.1% 53.8% 53.6% 
United States  Actual share  45.2% 54.3% 24.3% 
Theor. share  20.3% 18.8% 18.7% 33.4%
Rest of the world  Actual share  25.4% 15.9% 22.0% 39.1%
 
*Predicted share: ratio of host country's stock market capitalization to the stock market capitalization of the  
     world minus the source country;  
   Actual share: ratio of source country's equity investment in host country to total source country foreign 
     equity investment  
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Table 5. Bilateral portfolio equity holdings, all countries: 
panel regressions with fixed source and host effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Panel FE  Panel FE  Panel FE  IV Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 
Avg.  imports,  1997-2001  0.32 0.22 0.21 0.52 0.73 0.36 0.28 
  (17.93)**  (8.42)** (3.58)** (5.13)** (21.82)**  (8.24)** (4.81)** 
 
Log  distance    -0.61 -0.22     -0.75 -0.14 
   (9.17)**  (2.13)*    (8.04)**  (1.43) 
 
Time  difference   0.06  -0.04    0.04  -0.07 
   (4.52)**  (1.88)†    (1.83)†  (3.42)** 
         
Common  language    0.33 0.33 0.20   0.64 0.44 
   (3.63)**  (2.54)*  (1.43)   (4.82)**  (3.44)** 
 
Colony  dummy    0.19 0.30 0.21   0.50 0.26 
    (1.21) (1.39) (0.92)   (2.43)*  (1.24) 
 
Currency  union  dummy    1.33 0.33 0.61   0.12 0.19 
    (7.64)** (1.82)†  (2.73)**   (0.56)  (1.06) 
 
Tax  treaty    -0.10 -0.24 -0.25   0.19  -0.03 
    (1.36)  (2.05)* (1.86)†   (1.72)† (0.24) 
 
Correl.  in  growth  rates    0.17 0.61 0.59   0.65 0.63 
    (1.80)† (3.66)**  (2.00)*   (4.26)**  (3.76)** 
 
Correl. in stock returns      2.08  2.23      1.50 
    (4.52)**  (2.46)*    (3.16)** 
 
Correl. growth-stock ret.      0.49  1.07      0.28 
    (3.00)**  (1.80)†    (1.65)† 
 
Common legal origin      0.28  0.09      0.32 
    (2.93)**  (0.80)    (3.43)** 
 
Observations  4340 3306 1129 927  4340 3306 1129 
No.  of  host  countries  50 50 37 33 50 50 37 
No. of source countries  172  157  42  36  172  157  42 
Adjusted R
2  0.60 0.70 0.76        
Bilateral R
2  0.07 0.16 0.33        
Pseudo R
2     0.89  0.46  0.45  0.45 
Note: the dependent variable is log of 1+portfolio equity holdings of the source country in the 
host country. Regressions include fixed source and host country effects. t-statistics reported in 
parenthesis. †, *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
confidence level, respectively. Bilateral R
2  is the marginal explanatory power of the bilateral 
regressors, over and above the explanatory power of the host and source country fixed effects and 
is measured as one minus the squared residual standard error divided by the squared residual 
standard error of a regression on the fixed effects alone. 
. 
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Table 6. Bilateral portfolio equity holdings, OECD source countries: 
panel regressions with fixed source and host effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Panel  FE  Panel FE  Panel FE  IV  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 
Avg.  imports,  1997-2001  0.25 0.18 0.26 0.46 0.53 0.37 0.30 
  (13.06)**  (7.36)** (4.77)** (4.59)** (14.99)**  (8.07)** (5.51)** 
 
Log  distance   -0.43  -0.12    -0.47  -0.09 
   (6.15)**  (1.18)    (4.35)**  (0.91) 
 
Time  difference  0.05  -0.02    0.05  -0.02 
   (3.36)**  (0.83)    (2.07)*  (0.82) 
 
Common  language    0.25 0.26 0.16   0.47 0.26 
   (3.05)**  (2.04)*  (1.11)    (3.45)**  (2.07)* 
 
Colony  dummy    0.31 0.21 0.30   0.57 0.23 
   (2.39)*  (1.03)  (1.38)    (2.83)**  (1.15) 
 
Currency union dummy    0.12  0.48  0.61    0.03  0.48 
   (0.82)  (2.87)**  (2.69)**    (0.14)  (2.96)** 
 
Tax  treaty    -0.08 -0.27 -0.25   0.03  -0.23 
   (1.18)  (2.25)*  (1.87)†    (0.28)  (1.93)† 
 
Correl. in growth rates    0.26  0.11  0.51    0.36  0.04 
   (2.72)**  (0.64)  (1.78)†    (2.09)*  (0.22) 
 
Correl. in stock returns      0.19  -0.01      0.11 
    (0.37)  (0.01)    (0.21) 
 
Correl. growth-stock ret.      -0.12  0.59      -0.30 
    (0.71)  (1.03)    (1.72)† 
 
Common legal origin      0.25  0.15      0.28 
    (2.70)**  (1.40)    (3.05)** 
 
Observations  2528 2324 788  700  2528 2324 788 
No. of host countries  172  57  42  36  172  57  42 
No.  of  source  countries  23 23 22 22 23 23 22 
Adjusted R
2  0.86 0.87 0.87        
Bilateral R
2  0.07 0.11 0.23        
Pseudo R
2     0.91  0.51  0.51  0.50 
Note: the dependent variable is log of 1+portfolio equity holdings of the source country in the 
host country. Regressions include fixed source and host country effects. t-statistics reported in 
parenthesis. †, *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
confidence level, respectively. Bilateral R
2  is the marginal explanatory power of the bilateral 
regressors, over and above the explanatory power of the host and source country fixed effects and 
is measured as one minus the squared residual standard error divided by the squared residual 
standard error of a regression on the fixed effects alone. 
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Table 7. Bilateral portfolio equity holdings, emerging market source countries: 
panel regressions with fixed source and host effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Panel  FE  Panel FE  Panel FE  IV  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 
Avg.  imports,  1997-2001  0.19 0.18 0.23 0.81 0.71 0.23 0.24 
  (12.12)**  (4.73)** (1.68)  (5.19)** (14.81)**  (3.18)** (1.55) 
 
Log  distance   -0.08  -0.04    -0.59  -0.69 
   (0.99)  (0.15)    (4.18)**  (2.30)* 
 
Time  difference   -0.10  -0.11    -0.07  -0.08 
   (5.02)**  (2.62)**    (2.44)*  (1.86)† 
 
Common  lang.    0.24 0.06 -0.18    0.55 0.51 
    (1.77) (0.23) (0.66)   (2.71)**  (1.87)† 
 
Colony  dummy    1.42 1.55 1.21   1.38 0.98 
    (4.88)** (2.98)** (2.26)*    (3.67)** (1.90)† 
 
Tax  treaty    -0.02  0.10 0.08   0.42 0.44 
    (0.22) (0.41) (0.34)   (2.46)*  (1.71)† 
 
Correl. in growth rates    -0.07  0.40  0.70    0.12  0.20 
    (0.52) (1.01) (1.09)   (0.53) (0.47) 
 
Correl. in stock returns      0.42  -0.06      0.62 
    (0.40)  (0.06)    (0.53) 
 
Correl. growth-stock ret.      0.07  0.17      -0.05 
    (0.19)  (0.44)    (0.11) 
 
Common legal origin      0.35  0.26      0.50 
     (1.94)† 
 
(1.40)     (2.56)* 
 
Observations  1812  982 341 341 1812  982 341 
No. of host countries  172  157  42  42  172  157  42 
No.  of  source  countries  27 27 15 15 27 27 15 
Adjusted R
2  0.35  0.41  0.51      
Bilateral R
2  0.08  0.24  0.28      
Pseudo R
2     0.77  0.49  0.45  0.40 
Note: the dependent variable is log of 1+portfolio equity holdings of the source country in the 
host country. Regressions include fixed source and host country effects. t-statistics reported in 
parenthesis. †, *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
confidence level, respectively. Bilateral R
2  is the marginal explanatory power of the bilateral 
regressors, over and above the explanatory power of the host and source country fixed effects and 
is measured as one minus the squared residual standard error divided by the squared residual 
standard error of a regression on the fixed effects alone. 
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Table 8. Determinants of aggregate portfolio equity assets 
(2001 end-of-period stock) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












        
Log GDP  -0.24 -0.29 -0.16 0.32  -0.01 0.20 
  (1.14) (1.48) (0.77) (0.96) (0.02) (0.61) 
        
Log GDP per capita  0.58 0.90 0.87 1.35 1.41 1.44 
  (2.90)** (4.74)** (4.25)** (4.35)** (4.51)** (4.45)** 
        
Log domestic   0.56 0.47 0.35 0.58 0.65 0.45 
stock mkt cap  (3.20)** (2.98)** (2.09)*  (2.11)*  (2.51)*  (1.73)†   
        
Log exports  0.03 0.10 0.10 -0.00  0.01 0.07 
  (0.27) (1.16) (1.18) (0.01) (0.08) (0.52) 
        
Capital controls  -0.41  0.25 0.54 -0.83  -1.48  -0.25 
  (0.63) (0.43) (0.77) (0.83) (1.52) (0.23) 
        
Financial center   0.43 0.33 0.44 0.51 0.04 0.45 
  (0.85) (0.76) (1.04) (0.65) (0.06) (0.68) 
        
Sharpe ratio    -0.67    1.40   
   (0.41)    (0.52)   
        
Beta (1980-1996)    -0.02    -0.58 
    (0.06)    (1.13) 
        
SD of “beta residual”   -6.48    -11.49 
(1980-96)    (1.94)  †      (2.18)* 
        
Constant  -12.19 -10.48 -5.40  -13.17 -9.52  -2.12 
  (4.20)** (3.47)** (1.72)  (4.35)** (3.23)** (0.68) 
        
Observations  48 40 40 48 40 40 
Adjusted R
2  0.76 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.86 
 
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the fixed source country effect obtained from 
a panel regression of log bilateral equity holdings on log source country imports and other 
macroeconomic and structural variables (see Table 5, column (2)). The dependent variable in 
columns (4)-(6) is the log of the maximum stock of portfolio equity assets between the one 
reported in the CPIS and the one reported in the country’s International Investment Position. t-
statistics in parenthesis. †, *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent confidence level, respectively.  CPIS indicates the stock derived from the 2001 Portfolio 
Survey; IIP indicates the stock reported in the International Investment Position.   - 40 - 
 
Table 9. Determinants of aggregate portfolio equity liabilities 
(2001 end-of-period stock) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












Log  GDP  0.12 0.16 0.12 -0.00  0.11 0.19 
  (0.85) (1.22) (0.76) (0.02) (0.60) (0.90) 
Log  GDP  per  capita 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.27 0.33 0.31 
  (0.84) (1.10) (0.96) (1.90)†    (2.36)*  (2.12)* 
Log  domestic  stock  mkt  cap  0.46 0.48 0.53 0.71 0.66 0.63 
  (5.18)** (5.14)** (4.93)** (5.20)** (5.12)** (4.23)** 
Log  imports  0.12 0.02 0.00 0.45 0.21 0.14 
  (0.72) (0.11) (0.00) (1.86) †   (1.02)  (0.68) 
Capital  controls  -0.22 0.17  0.09  -0.43 -0.00 0.01 
  (0.49) (0.35) (0.18) (0.63) (0.01) (0.01) 
Financial  center  dummy  0.63 0.67 0.65 0.59 0.75 0.82 
  (2.20)* (2.73)**  (2.57)* (1.34)  (2.23)* (2.35)* 
Middle  East  dummy  -1.23 -1.04 -0.97 -1.73  -1.99 -1.93 
  (4.95)** (2.88)** (2.60)*  (4.53)** (4.00)** (3.81)** 
Sharpe  ratio  (1980-1996)   0.77    0.56   
   (1.13)    (0.60)   
Beta (1980-1996)    0.05    0.21 
    ( 0 . 3 2 )     ( 1 . 0 2 )  
SD of “beta residual”    1.92    -1.02 
(1980-96)    ( 0 . 9 4 )     ( 0 . 3 7 )  
Constant  -1.75 -1.74 -1.69 -5.54 -4.27 -3.96 
  (1.80) †   (1.51)  (1.44)  (3.71)**  (2.69)*  (2.46)* 
Observations  65 47 47 65 47 47 
Adjusted R
2  0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.93 
R
2 when dep. var. is log 
(equity/mkt cap) 
   0.44  0.54  0.53 
 
* Dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the fixed host country effect obtained from a panel 
regression of log bilateral equity holdings on a set of macroeconomic and structural variables (see 
Table 5, column (2)). Dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the log of the maximum stock of 
portfolio equity liabilities between the one reported in the CPIS and the one reported in the 
country’s International Investment Position. t-statistics in parenthesis. CPIS indicates the stock 
derived from the 2001 Portfolio Survey; IIP indicates the stock reported in the International 
Investment Position. †, *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 




Table A1. Sample size, number of observations=0, and total equity holdings 
            
All countries 
Sample   # source # host  # observations total source equity holdings  
    
total =0 US $ 
billion
% of no offshore with 
trade
Full 67 223 7069 4293 5163 
No offshore, with trade  50 172 4340 2715 3956 100%
   add macro variables  50 157 3126 1579 3952 99.9%
     add stock mkt variables  42 48 1459 239 3947 99.8%
       add CLO  37 42 1129 132 3917 99.0%
            
OECD 
Sample   # source # host  # observations total source equity holdings  
     total =0 US $ 
billion
% of no offshore with 
trade
Full 24 223 3779 1885 4921 
No offshore, with trade  23 172 2528 1398 3840 100.0%
   add macro variables  23 157 2171 1086 3836 99.9%
     add stock mkt variables  23 48 897 46 3832 99.8%
       add CLO  23 42 788 38 3809 99.2%
            
European Union sample 
Sample   # source # host  # observations total source equity holdings  
    
total =0 US $ 
billion
% of no offshore with 
trade
Full 15 223 2171 1127 2449 
No offshore, with trade  23 172 1528 806 1773 100.0%
   add macro variables  23 157 1316 628 1771 99.9%
     add stock mkt variables  23 48 582 29 1769 99.8%
       add CLO  23 42 510 24 1759 99.2%
            
Emerging market sample 
Sample    # source # host  # observations total source equity holdings  
    
total =0 US $ 
billion
% of no offshore with 
trade
Full 43 223 3224 2408 224.1 
No offshore, with trade  27 172 1812 1317 116.2 100.0%
   add macro variables  27 157 955 493 115.6 99.5%
     add stock mkt variables  19 48 562 193 114.6 98.6%
       add CLO  14 42 341 94 107.6 92.6%
            
Total equity holdings: sum of portfolio equity holdings of source countries included in the sample. 
% of no offshore with trade: total equity holdings divided by equity holdings for the sample excluding 
offshore centers, with trade.   - 42 - 
 
Table A2. Portfolio equity investment: the role of financial and offshore centers 
 
Largest portfolio equity asset holdings in 
offshore and financial centers 
  
Largest derived equity liabilities to offshore 
and financial centers 
 
US$ billion 
Share of total 
portf. equity 
assets 
  US$ 
billion 
Share of derived 
portfolio equity 
liabs. 
United States  197.0 12.3%   United  States  167.3  16.8%
Germany  104.4 27.4%   United  Kingdom  77.0  10.9%
Italy  103.7 43.3%   Germany  41.4  15.3%
Switzerland  73.0 29.5%   France  38.2  9.8%
Belgium  49.8 46.9%   Japan  29.0  8.7%
Hong Kong  42.9 45.3%   Netherlands  22.4  7.8%
France  26.6 14.4%   Switzerland  18.9  9.4%
United Kingdom  19.3 3.5%   Italy  17.7  14.8%
Japan  18.3 8.1%   Cayman  Islands  15.2  16.6%
Luxembourg  13.2 4.1%   Luxembourg  12.5  3.4%
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Figure 1. Degree of foreign equity bias 



















bias>0.75 0.25<bias<0.75 -0.25<bias<0.25 -0.75<bias<-0.25 bias<-0.75 
 
The histogram measures the fraction of total observations for which the foreign equity bias falls within 
given bounds. The foreign equity bias is defined as 1 – (equity holdings ratio/market cap ratio) where the 
equity holdings ratio equals source country holdings in the host country divided by total equity holdings by 
the source country, and the market cap ratio equals market capitalization in the host country divided by 
world stock market capitalization.   - 44 - 
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